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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
later statute.if the two are not clearly repugnant, unless the intent to
do so is clearly expressed.' 8 , Sections 970-974 of the Penal Law deal
with specific incidents of the game of "policy" other than the actual
running of the game by "insiders". The court recognizes that Sec-
tion 1372 19 of the Penal Law is directed at those persons who manage
or direct the enterprise or scheme, that is, those who "contrive, pro-
pose or draw a lottery or assist in so doing". This offense constitutes
a felony. On the other hand, the so-called "policy" statutes later
enacted are directed at those persons who commit minor offenses in
connection with "policy" games.20 For these lesser offenses, a lesser
penalty is provided . 2  The interpretation of the lottery and "policy"
statutes in the instant case is a salutary one, for,'while it permits more
frequent convictions of minor offenders under the "policy" statutes for
misdemeanors, it preserves the sanction of a punishment for a felony
under the lottery statutes for those persons actually running the game,
the organizers and "bosses". This position is supported by a review
of the history of the so-called lottery and "policy" statutes in New
York.22
J. E. M.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-CoNSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE LAW
LEVYING TAXx ON NON-RESIDENT CORPORATION.-In February of
1938 the appellant, a New York corporation, rented a portion of a
North Carolina hotel for the purpose of displaying its wares and
merchandise. While it did not sell any of its commodities in that
state, it did, however, take orders which were subsequently filled at
its New York place of business and from there shipped directly to the
consumer. The State of North Carolina, pursuant to its statute,'
Is People v. Dwyer, 215 N. Y. 46, 109 N. E. 103 (1915) ; N. Y. PENAL LAW
§ 2500.
19 See note 3, supra.
20 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 974 provides that it shall be a misdemeanor to keep
a place where "policy" slips are sold, or to sell such slips, or to make collections.
23 One of the reasons for making certain acts, in connection with "policy"
misdemeanors, was to bring them within the jurisdiction of the Court of Special
Sessions and thereby to make prosecutions more swift and to increase the num-
ber of convictions by making the penalties less drastic. People v. Hines, 168
Misc. 453, 465, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 2 (1938).
22 For a historical review of these statutes see People v. Hines, 168 Misc.
453, 458, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 2 (1938).
1 N. C. Laws 1937, c. 127, § 121 (e) ("Every person, firm, or corporation,
not being a regular retail merchant in the State of North Carolina, who shall
display samples, goods, wares, or merchandise in any hotel room, or in any
house rented or occupied temporarily, for the purpose of securing orders for the
retail sale of such goods, wares, or merchandise so displayed, shall apply for in
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required the petitioner to pay in advance $250.00 for a license to con-
duct the display. This was paid by the corporation under protest.
This annual license tax upon displays was to be levied upon any
corporation which did not conduct a retail business within the state,
whether domestic or not. The appellant, which seeks a refund of
the amount, does not deny coming under the provisions of the statute
but asserts, however, that the tax is unconstitutional under the com-
merce clause of the United States Constitution. 2 This assertion is
predicated upon the fact that merchants of the same group who con-
duct business within the state pay only $1.00 for the same privilege.3
In its suit against the Commissioner of Revenue for the State, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina twice denied the application 4 for
a refund and the petitioner appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. Held, judgment reversed, and the tax declared unconstitu-
tional. Best & Company, Inc. v. A. J. Maxwell, Commissioner of
Revenue for the State of North Carolina, - U. S. -, 61 Sup. Ct.
334 (1940).
The power to insure uniformity of commercial regulations
against discriminating state legislation, was vested in Congress by the
Constitution. The non-exercise of this power by the legislative body
tends to declare that such commerce shall be free from any restric-
tions.5 The basic principle behind this doctrine is to create a freedom
which would result in greater interstate commercial activity. The
State of North Carolina hindered such activity by discouraging extra-
state merchants because of its legislative assessment which discrimi-
nated in favor of intrastate business. Despite the fact that the law taxed
residents as well as nonresidents, the fact is that those who did conduct
business therein would also normally be residents of the state. To
avoid this tax it would necessitate the formation of a retail business at
prohibitive expense. Looking at the substance of the statute rather
than the language, it is to be seen that the license fee was a mere
expedient to foster the domestic commerce by means of unequal and
oppressive burdens upon merchants of other states. To allow a law
of this kind to exist would result in a curtailment of that which was
intended by the framers of the Constitution. Furthermore, it would
advance and procure a State license from the Commissioner of Revenue for the
privilege of displaying such samples, goods, wares, or merchandise, and shall
pay an annual privilege tax of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250.00), which
license shall entitle such person, firm or corporation to display such samples,
goods, wares, or merchandise in any county in this State.").
2. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8(3) ("The Congress shall have power . . . to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes").
3 N. C. Laws 1937, c. 147, § 405.
4216 N. C. 114, 3 S. E. (2d) 292 (1939) ; 217 N. C. 134, 6 S. E. (2d) 893
(1940).
5 Welton v. The State of Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875).
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be contrary to the well settled precedent established by the cases
interpreting the commerce clause.6
J. A. S.
LABOR DISPUTE-APPLICABILITY oF NORmS-LAGUARwDA ACT
WHEN ANTI-TRUST AcT Is INVoLvED.-Plaintiffs 1 sought to enjoin
the defendants 2 from attempting to unionize the employees of the
plaintiff dairies including certain independent-contractor drivers
known as "vendors" 3 and also from picketing certain cut-rate stores
which purchased milk from the plaintiff dairies. It was contended
by the plaintiffs that the controversy was not a labor dispute, but
that defendants' acts constituted an unlawful secondary boycott for
the purpose of obtaining for the defendants' employers a milk
monopoly contrary to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Held, the con-
troversy arose out of a "labor dispute" involving associations of em-
ployees and employers, all of whom are engaged in the milk industry,
and the picketing constituted an effort to compel the "vendors" and
drivers of the plaintiff dairies to join the defendant union. As a
"labor dispute" was involved, notwithstanding the alleged violations
of the Sherman Act, compliance with the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
deemed a prerequisite to injunctive relief. Since th requirements
of that Act had not been met here, the Court did not have jurisdic-
tion to grant an injunction. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, etc. v.
Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., et al., 310 U. S. 91, 61 Sup. Ct.
122 (1940).
The lower court found that the defendants had attempted for
some time to unionize the employees of the plaintiff and other cut-
6 Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434 (1879) (an ordinance of Baltimore, which
required vessels laden with the products of other states to pay for the use of
the public wharfs of that city, is in conflict with the Constitution of the United
States) ; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344 (1880) ; Robbins v. Shelby County,
120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. ,Ct. 592 (1886) ; Baldwin, Commissioner of Agriculture &
Markets, et al. v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 55 Sup. Ct. 497 (1935)
("The state statute must not be discriminatory, and it must not conflict with any
regulation of commerce enacted by Congress") ; Hale, et at. v. Bimco Trading,
Inc., et at., 306 U. S. 375, 59 Sup. Ct. 526 (1939) (a Florida statute, requiring
inspection and imposing an inspection fee of fifteen cents per hundredweight on
cement imported from abroad, held invalid under the commerce clause of the
Constitution where same fee was not imposed on domestic cement).
I There are four plaintiffs: one was the Chicago local of a C. I. 0. union,
the Amalgamated Dairy Workers; two were Chicago dairies whose milk was
processed and distributed by members of the C. I. 0. union; the fourth was a
Wisconsin cooperative association which supplied milk to the plaintiff dairies.
2 The defendants were the Chicago local of the A. F. of L. Milk Wagon
Drivers Union, and its officials.
3 These "vendors" buy milk from the plaintiff dairies and resell it at whole-
sale to retail stores. The dairy takes back any unsold milk at full purchase
price. They are practically employees of the dairies.
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